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1 According  to  the  definition  of  local  brokers  given  in  the  call  for  papers  for  the
conference,  they  are  "social  actors  who  belong  to  a  local  arena".  Local  brokers  are
situated  "at  the  interface  between  the  project's  beneficiaries  and  the  development
agencies".  They  act  between  two  different  systems :  the  international  system  of
development  aid  and the system of  local  communities.  Therefore,  local  development
brokers can be analysed from two perspectives.
2 One  perspective  is  that  of  the  local  community,  the  other  is  that  of  the  system of
development aid. Usually local development brokers are considered as representatives of
the local population and they are analysed as part of the local community. I will analyse
them from the other angle, as part of the system of development aid.
3 The international system of development aid, which I will call briefly "the development
system"  has  always  used  brokers.  Starting  from  colonial  policy  the  native  local
administration played that role, later after independence the local administration came
in. Beside the administration there were other brokers : missionaries, ethnic associations
or moderate African political  leaders (Seeley 1985).  But in the top‑down approach of
development  policy  their  role  was  limited.  The  Africans  who  were  part  of  the
administration  were  seen  as  implementators  not  as  real  brokers.  The  other  brokers
representing the local communities directly or acting as advocates gave some helpful
information  on  the  beneficiaries,  but  the  administration  did  not  see  them  as  real
partners.
4 During  the  eighties,  after  a  change  in  the rhetoric  in  development  policy,  the  local
development  brokers  became  more  important.  After  a  number  of  failures  and
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disappointments in development, institution building is now one of the new slogans. The
idea  is  to  promote  development  through  societal  self‑organisation  as  a  part  of  a
bottom‑up approach. This is why NGOs and self‑help groups are supported.
5 We  should  see  the  difference  between  two  types  of  voluntary  associations :
Self‑help‑groups are mainly interested in the well‑being of their group and follow mainly
their  own  interest.  Other  organisations  like  charities  adress  themselves  mainly  to
non‑members  and their  workis  in  principle  of  benefit  for  the  public  (gemeinnützig).  By
non‑governmental‑organisations (NGOs),  I  mean only the letter type of organisation that
works for non‑members. NGOs, in this narrow sense of the term, are together with other
development agencies very important supporters of self‑help‑groups.
6 The  bottom‑up  approach  should  allow  a  more  consequent  needs  orientation,  the
guarantee of participation and the strengthening of accountability to the beneficiaries.
The rhetoric of grass‑roots‑oriented development agencies, like NGOs, draws a picture of
a development utopia : small peasants and urban poor are organised in self‑help‑groups
and take their fate in their own hands. The development starts from the grass‑roots and
will bring the change that we have awaiting for decades. These grass‑root‑groups earn
our support, helping them means strengthening a healthy and well‑founded sustainable
development.
7 This  new  grass‑roots  development  approach  makes  the  interface  between  the  local
system and the international development system more important, because reaching the
beneficiaries directly is now a target in itself. But how can the development agencies get
in touch with the grass‑roots ? The local administration has been accused of ignoring the
people's needs and being an instrument of control instead of development. Therefore,
other  ways  of  getting  in  touch  with  grass‑roots  have  to  be  found.  This  is  where
development  brokers  come  in.  They  promise  to  help  the  development  agencies  in
reaching the grass‑roots. 
8 The  role  of  a  broker  implies  two  different  images.  A  broker  might  be  a  necessary
intermediate, somebody who brings people together, acting as a kind of catalyst. Brokers
are also mistrusted as people who seek their own interest first. They misuse their special
position and cheat one or even both of their clients. To put it extremely, they are catalysts
or  parasites.  Talking  of  rent  seeking  behaviour  at  a  local  level  or  of  patron‑client
relationships points out the negative image of a broker whose role is at best ambiguous.
9 This  kind  of  question  might  lead  us  to  the  personality  of  the  brokers,  their  moral
standards  and their  embeddedness  into local  social  relationships.  But  this  is  not  my
intention. I want to understand the local development brokers as part of the development
system. I will deal with two main questions From this perspective my first question is :
Who are the brokers at the local level ? We will see that the role of a broker must not only
be played by born members of the local community, they can be played by outsiders, too.
We have to state that a simple three actor model Le. beneficiaries‑broker‑development
agency  is  not  sufficient  in  reality,  we  have  a  chain  of  brokers  or  patron‑client
relationships.
10 My second question is : How do the brokers fit into the development system ? The role of
brokers should be evaluated from the perspective of the development system using the
targets of the bottom‑up approach promoted in the development rhetoric. Brokers are
now an established element of the development policy. At first glance, they seem to be
quite successful at linking beneficiaries to the development system. The picture changes
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when taking the target of development agencies seriously. The brokers help to produce
the reality the development system is looking for. The result is a kind of distorted societal
self‑organisation  which  cannot  overcome  structural  problems  of  the  development
system.
11 The findings presented here are based on an extensive field study in Kenya and Rwanda. I
conducted the study that focussed on the work of mostly African NGOs in the 80s and at
the beginning of the 90s, that is to say before the war in Rwanda (Neubert 1994 ; 1995). My
study  included  some  governmental  and  international  development  agencies.  With
regards to the role of local brokers there was no typical difference between NGOs and
other types of agencies.
Types of brokers
12 The great number of self‑help groups shows a quantitative success of the grass‑roots
approach. The figures are impressing : In Kenya, there are somewhere between 15,000
and  26,000  self‑help  groups  (Barkan/Holmquist  1989 :  360 ;  Fowler  1989 :  7)  and  in
Rwanda there were 15,000 groups with about 500,000 members (IWACU 1989 : 1) which
was equivalent to 15 % of the population (over 15 years).
13 In the bottom‑up approach, the creation of self‑help groups should be supported and the
groups must be linked to the development system. This concludes some basic elements
for the NGOs and other development agencies. In the self‑perception of the grass‑roots
oriented development agencies, the co‑operation between the agency and a grass‑root
group starts with an agreement of co‑operation. According to bottom‑up approach, the
people themselves have to solve their own problems and use their own resources. The
development agencies want to play only the role of a supporter or a facilitator only. They
cannot deal with every individual, but groups can be supported. The people should be
strong as a groupe in those cases where groups already exist, the agency and the group
have to clarify their joint project. Therefore, the promotion of self‑help should start with
a needs assessment. The fieldworkers of the supporting NGO should discuss the groups'
needs with them, make priorities and develop an appropriate project. The project can
start after this needs assessment in the self‑perception of the agencies, this first phase of
the process is of extreme importance and a couple of negotiation sessions are needed. A
staff member of a Rwandan NGO put this notion in a brief statement : "Ce sont les paysans
qui décident".
14 It is highly important for development agencies that follow this self‑help approach to
avoid so called "gift projects". These are projects in which groups that do not contribute
substantially to the project receive support (financially or with goods) by the agency
(Crombrugghe/Bitega 1988 : 20). Even if the group members are poor, they should prove
their interest in the project through contributions in kind or work.
15 In practice, the initial phase of self‑help projects is different. The development agencies
are not dealing with all group members but with representatives of the groups who are
called "peasant leaders" or even with local administrators or notables. "Peasant leaders",
administrators  and notables  act  as  brokers.  Mostly the development agencies  do not
reflect the special role of these brokers. Sometimes they do not even notice that brokers
are involved. Additionally, the agencies take the existence of self‑help groups for granted.
This initiating phase of the projects includes two tasks, the organisation of the group and
the  installation  of  a  linkage  between  groups  and  the  development  agency.  Simple
brokerage  is  not  sufficient  to  initiate  a  project  the  groups  have  to  be  founded  and
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organised.  Therefore,  many  of  the  so  called  brokers  initiate  the  groups  and  act  as
intermediaries to the development agency at the same time.
16 If we looking at East Africa, a variety of brokers or initiators can be seen. A study of local
self‑help groups in Kenya called harambee‑groups gives some empirical data about the
founders of self‑help groups. Only about a quarter were peasants or artisans, a somewhat
bigger  group  were  community  development  assistants  and  staff  of  the  local
administration. The biggest group consisted of teachers, businessmen, priests or clerks
(Mbithi/Rasmusson  1977 :  57).  In  Rwanda.  two‑thirds  of  the  group  founders  were
peasants (including some artisans),  the other groups were founded by administrative
staff, priests and other professionals (IWACU 1987 27 ; Nzisabira 1992 : 183).
17 Self‑help groups consisting of peasants are not always initiated and founded by peasants.
The same applies to groups of artisans. A substantial proportion of the founders comes
from "outside" the self‑help group. Especially in the case of groups with some success and
long  lasting  activities,  outsiders  are  involved  in  the  foundation  of  the  group.  They
accompany the development process of the group, stabilise and push the group forwards.
I will call these people "promoters". Mostly, the promoter acts also as the broker who
makes contact with the development agency.  Due to the work of  the promoters,  the
development agencies find not only self‑help groups but organised local partners also.
18 In Kenya, the role of promoters is frequently played by the local middle class. In Rwanda,
the situation is somewhat different. Successful promoters are in many cases expatriates
(Europeans,  North Americans)  such as  priests  or  volunteers  working in development
projects and who deal with the self‑help groups along with their main job. One reason is
that the middle class in Rwanda is very small. Expatriates hold quite a number of middle
class positions in the local communities (i.e. technicians, nurses, medical doctors, priests).
They  act  at  the  same  time  as  brokers  between  the  local  communities  and  the
development agencies and as advocates of the local community. Additionally, in Kenya,
one  can  find  a  great  number  of  African  associations  like  independent  churches,
independent schools  and other voluntary associations.  Thus,  Kenya has been gaining
good  organisational  experiences  since  colonial  times.  In  Rwanda,  experiences  in
self‑organisation were blocked by the administration until the seventies.
19 Some of the local promoters created a network of self‑help groups, local projects, schools,
community centres or health facilities. These activities might be only informally linked.
In other cases, they are put together to form a unified organisational structure with own
staff  and  formalised  administrative  structures.  Again  the  promoters  of  Rwandan
networks of  this  type are very often expatriates.  A few of  these networks and their
promoters were known even in other parts  of  the country (the co‑operative "Kiaka"
promoted by J.P. Godding, the projects of Father Maurer in Ruhengeri or of Father de
Schaetzen in Kabgayi). This organisational process may even lead to the creation of a
development agency legally registered as an NGO (association sans but lucratif, asbl) 1.
20 Successful promoters must have the confidence of the people.  They must understand
people's attitudes, ideas and perspective and above all they must motivate and inspire
their followers. One requirement is a personal authority combined with integrity. Those
expatriates who play this role have lived for a long time (years or even decades) in the
local community. They are part of the community and at least in the beginning, they were
not full‑time promoters and had another function, e.g. as priest 2. These promoters can
wait with their activities until there is a chance to initiate an activity. They can react to
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the  local  situation and are  not  under  pressure  to  push group formation or  projects
immediately.
21 Up to this point, we have identified different types of brokers : First brokers and group
initiators who are at the same time members of the so called target groups, i.e. peasants
or local artisans who act as group members. The brokers of the second type live in the
local community, too. But they come from outside the target groups like local middle
c1ass people or expatriates who live in the community.
22 There is also a third type of broker : Some of the development agencies try to act directly
as  local  promoters  and group initiators  and place  own community  workers  into  the
community (in Rwanda : ARDI ; DUHAMIC‑ADRI ; in Kenya : Institute of Cultural Affairs ;
Gikonyo 1982 ; Miller 1983). These community workers are full‑time professionals and act
as full‑time promoters. They have to concentrate all their efforts on self‑help promotion.
Limited in time, they are under pressure to present results. They cannot wait until the
right opportunity for a project comes, they have to act immediately. A stay of some weeks
or even some months in a rural community is not long "enough to let confidence, trust
and authority grow. The position of these community workers in the community is based
mainly on the support they can offer in the form of  goods, money or services.
23 The different types of promoters or brokers mentioned are not clearly separated. In some
cases, different brokers and promoters can be involved. A local group might be initiated
by a missionary, organised by a local c1erk, led by a "peasant leader", registered, looked
after by the local administration and be at the same type the local partner for more than
one  development  agency.  Probably  a  local  project‑network  or  NOO  acts  as  an
intermediate for a World Bank or UNDP project.  Especially,  dynamic groups can find
more than one partner and all agencies, promoters or brokers involved with the group
feel responsible for it's success. (One group in Rwanda complained that in one week they
had to come together every day to meet their different partners).
24 The  simple  three  actor  model  i.e.  beneficiaries‑broker‑development  agency  is  not
sufficient.  In Many cases there is a number of people involved in the organisation al
process of self‑help groups and projects including initiators,  leaders,  promoters,  local
brokers,  different  fieldworkers  of  development  agencies  related  in  a  network.  These
networks are structured hierarchically as kind of patron‑client relationships that reach
from the grass‑roots to the head office of the international donors (Müller 1992). Looking
for broker competition we do not  have only competition between "old" brokers  and
"new" brokers but also competition between different new brokers, like local peasant
leaders, local project staff,  missionaries, expatriate volunteers or administrators, local
intellectuals, and some indigenous NGOs. I will not follow this line further because my
focus is the role of the brokers in the development system.
The role of brokers in the development system : catalysts or parasites ?
25 Promoters or brokers take a part in the work of development agencies at the grass‑roots,
even though the development agencies do not realise that local promoters or brokers are
involved. That brokers are there does not mean that they are always helpful and efficient.
From the perspective of the development aid system, we have to ask whether they fit into
the development system. Do they support the work of the development agencies ? Do
they  really  fulfil  their  function  of  brokerage  between  the  target  groups  and  the
development  agencies ?  Or  do  brokers  have  more  selfish  motives  and  follow  their
personal interests ? To put it bluntly, are they catalysts or parasites ?
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26 When evaluating the efficiency of brokers in terms of the development agency and the
development aid system we should keep the development targets in mind e.g. promotion
of self‑help and self‑organisation, need orientation, participation and the strengthening
of accountability to the beneficiaries.
27 If one asks the NGOs whom they prefer as speaker of the grass‑roots, they name the so
called peasant leaders. Peasant leaders seem to be the best brokers because they indicate
real self‑organisation and the expression of felt‑needs of the target groups. But as already
mentioned in  "successful"  and bigger  self‑help projects  of  development  agencies  the
brokers  are  very  often  members  of  the  local  midd1e  class,  professionals  or  even
expatriates.
28 This type of broker is usually criticised. They are suspect of following their individual
interests,  misusing  their  position  as  brokers  to  maximise the  local  power  base  and
bypassing the needs of poor peasants (Tendler 1982 : 25‑28). One typical consequence of
the development agencies is to find the "real" leaders who should act as brokers and
guarantee real participation and real need orientation.
29 This  solution  identifies  the  problem  from  the  local  communities'  side.  If  they  are
organised  properly  and  present  honourable  brokers  full  of  integrity,  then  the
development targets could be fulfilled. Based on this attitude, the individual self‑interest
of  the  brokers,  their  rent‑seeking  behaviour  is  seen  as  one  important  reason  for
disappointing results of self‑help projects. Looking more profundly into the development
system and the organisational logic of the development system, the problem must be
stated differently.
30 To understand the development system better we should look into the reality of self‑help
promotion.  The  core  idea  of  self‑help  promotion  is  the  support  of  a  process  of
self‑organisation. Groups should come together, discover their own resources and take
their fate in their own hands. The projects should only push a little bit, help them to
become organised and draw back afterwards. Aid in goods, money or services should only
supplement the process of self‑organisation.
31 If we look at the experiences made in Kenya and Rwanda, we can see that aid in goods,
rnoney or services is in fact dominant When a self‑help group contacts a development
agency  or  when people  are  willing  to  organise  themselves  following  a  request from
outside as a self‑help‑group, then the group usually waits for direct aid in terms of goods,
money  and  sometimes  in  services.  They  are  not  interested  in  support  for
self‑organisation.  This  is  no  surprise.  What  the  groups  lack  is  money or  goods.  The
creation of  this  type of  groups is  a  kind of  "collective petition" to the development
agency.
32 These self‑help‑projects do not live up to the ideal of a self‑organising group using own
resources for development. These projects are at first a means of distribution of services
and goods. Therefore, they should at least follow the peoples' needs. But in reality, the
groups are interested in getting any kind of help and they will take what ever they get. For
them, it is reasonable to see what kind of projects the development agency might deliver
and adapt their needs to this supply. They will try to show the right priorities to keep in
touch with the agency. The experienced groups can see from the organisation's name at
the  car  what  they  should  present  as  their  "needs"  (see :  the  drawing  at  the  end).
Community health is not always one of the most wanted services, especially when this
will not lead to a health centre that operates free of charge. In many areas of Rwanda,
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even the provision of clean water is not a high priority, especially when there is already
some water. They way to the tap with clean water might be longer than the way to the
river or creek, and sometimes the tapped water has to be paid for.
33 Briefly : The supply of the development agency is the main factor for the expression of a
so called "felt‑need". This turns the idea of a needs assessment upside down.
34 What the development agencies really offer reflects mostly the perspective of the North
on urgent needs of the population. If we want to get an idea of what the people really
want, we have to look at projects which are organised by the groups using their own
money. In Rwanda and some years ago in Kenya also you could find parents associations
who founded their own primary or secondary schools. Only you can hardly ever find a
development agency which is willing to promote a traditional school‑project 3.
35 The self‑help projects not only miss the felt‑needs of the people, they also have problems
reaching their target group, the "poorest of the poor". This is not at all surprising. To
participate in self‑help, to mobilise its own resources is only possible when the people
already have some resources. This is definitely not the case for the poorest of the poor 4.
Even labour  might  be  scarce  in  very  poor  families,  like  in  the  case of  women with
children,  who  are  mostly  occupied  to  feed  and  care  for  the  family.  The  promising
self‑help projects, and there are promising ones, are mostly run by lower middle‑class
members or "better off" poor people. The poorest group might only gain through paid
low income jobs in the project.
36 The  self‑help  groups  who  use  the  support  supply  do  not  meet  the  targets  of  the
development policy. This is not the result of selfish brokers who block the access of the
development agencies to "real" self‑help groups. The problem lies in the preconceived
ideas and opinions of the development agencies about "real needs" and possibilities of the
self‑help approach.
37 Additionally,  the  development  agencies  working  at  the  grass‑roots  level  are  under
pressure  from  the  development  system  that  makes  the  implementation  of  self‑help
projects  even  more  complicated.  Development  agencies  who  want  to  work  at  the
grass‑roots level must have access to it. They need self‑help groups as partners in order
to prove their efficiency and their success. Once the development agency receives a grant
for a project, the money has to be used in the planned time schedule. In these cases, the
development agencies must find a local partner immediately. There is no time for a needs
assessment or to check the capabilities of the group. Once all local partners have been
identified,  the  development  agency  has  no  additional  resources  left  and  there  is  no
interest at all in finding new groups. Even an extremely promising group will not have a
chance of receiving support. It is especially the situation of the development agency that
determines  the  chances  of  a  group  of  becoming  pan  of  a  grass‑roots  development
program.
38 The chance that the expectations of the group and those of the development agency
concur depends on the possibilities and approach of the development agency. Agencies
who have funds for direct support in goods or money meet mostly the wishes of the
groups. These agencies will find local partners easily. But this is an unusual situation
because support like this would be a "gut project" that should be avoided.
39 Usually, the development agency has special project ideas, such as the promotion of new
farming  techniques,  small  credit  schemes  or  a  whole  bundle  including  agricultural
extension service and community work. Grants in money or in the form of goods are seen
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only as incentives. In theory, the needs assessment should clarify whether the group and
the agency can come together or not. Usually instead of a needs assessment a special kind
of negotiation process takes place. As a result, the expectations of the agency and of the
group are shaped until they match. The development agency accepts the necessity of aid
in the form of money or goods and the group takes the kind of project the agency offers ;
no matter whether the project meets their own priorities (Mazimpaka et al. 1990 : 35 ;
Mutaru 1991 : 43). In the course of this process, the brokers can prove their capabilities. 
40 This process of project installation has nothing to do with idea of participation and need
orientation.  At  best,  the  development  agency,  supported  by  the  broker  shapes  non
specified needs for aid into a project. In most cases, a co‑operation takes place when a
development agency that is looking for local partners happens to meet a group willing
and experienced enough to adapt to the pro gram of the agency. Projects are mostly not
the result of a rationally planned process of project identification but the outcome of
uncontrolled coincidence.
41 The  special  logic  of  this  process  can  be  shown using  a  concept  from the  theory  of
organisation,  the  "garbage  can  model  of  organisational  choice"  (Cohen/March/Olsen
1972). The model describes a situation where "choices looking for problems, issues and
feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for
issues to which they might be an answer..." (ibd. 2). Applying this concept to the process
of project identification at the grass‑roots level, we may talk of a "garbage can model of
project identification".
42 Local  development  brokers  act  in  this  "garbage can" by looking for  problems which
match the solutions of the development agencies. "Effective" brokers present problems
(or needs) that the agency is willing to meet. The skill of the brokers is to select elements
of the reality that fit into the agency's program. They shape reality into a form that suits
the development agency. In presenting grass‑roots needs which meet the expectations of
the development agency, the brokers strengthen the myth of grass‑root orientation and
self‑organisation.  They  can  make  the  agency  believe,  that  the  grass‑roots  are
participating in project decisions. 
43 In  fact,  the  existence  of  brokers  works  against  the  grass‑roots  orientation  and
self‑organisation.  They risk  being caught  in  an "authority  trap"  and becoming mere
transmitters of the development agencies ideas. For the local community, a successful
broker  is  somebody  who  gets  resources  because  he  knows  what  needs  should  be
presented. Being successful creates authority, which is especially strong in the case of
brokers who are not members of the target groups and who already have a higher status
in the local community. 
44 The danger lies in the possibility that the groups rely on the local broker who has the real
decision making power and not the elected chairpersons 5. This does not mean that the
projects and the activities are not successful. In many cases, the brokers or promoters are
practising an "enlighted top‑down approach" (Tendler 1982 : 15) The broker or promoter
decides what is to be done and might realise useful projects together with the group.
There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  brokers  or  promoters  always  follow  the  needs  and
interests of the people. They might block participation to save their position or try to
gain  some  political  or  financial  advantage  from  their  position  (Bierschenk/Elwert/
Kohnert 1993 : 98f). 
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45 Inside  the  development  system,  all  brokers  have  the  task  of  adapting  the  group's
expectations  and  activities  to  the  development  agencies'  approach.  The  brokers  are
dependent on the agency because the authority of the brokers in the groups is based on
the access to the support of the agency. 
46 From the question of independence, some old fashioned mostly expatriate brokers have
some strategic  advantages.  Missionaries  or  (long  rime)  expatriate  volunteers  receive
more confidence by overseas donors than indigenous brokers. Expatriate brokers may
shape programs of donors. Some of them have access to alternative resources which are
not completely dominated by the development policy discourse (supporter groups, third
world groups). These brokers have the chance of listening to local needs and following
local priorities. Therefore, some of their projects are far better suited to the felt‑needs of
the population. But they cannot escape the authority trap. Because of their access to
resources they are even more uncontrollable and criticising them openly is extremely
difficult (Tendler 1982 : 25‑28).
Conclusion
47 The question of whether brokers are catalysts or parasites is posed in the wrong way.
They might be both or nothing of this. The structure of the development system in which
the brokers are acting is the main factor influencing project decisions. The development
system selects the brokers who fit into the system.
48 Brokers who are willing to challenge the ideas of the development agencies are rarely
accepted. Not the felt‑needs of the grass‑roots presented by brokers are changing the
approach  of the  development  aid  system  but  international  fashions  of  development
policy. Or how could the recent world‑wide priorities in development policy of ecology
and women's projects be explained ? There is no reason why poor people all over the
world recognised the same needs at exactly the same rime.
49 The brokers are part of a supply‑led‑process (Fowler 1989 :  3) which creates self‑help
groups,  and a  set  of  needs  that  seem to  be  the  outcome of  an autonomous  societal
self‑organisation.
50 This creates a special realm of development projects. The realm of development projects
is part of community life, but community life is usually presented only distorted in the
projects that guide the perception of the agencies.
51 Successful brokers present the agencies with the reality that the agencies are looking for.
In  this  perspective,  the  brokers  are  brokers  in  definitions  of  reality.  Brokers  might
present  a  "real"  reality  where a  dynamic self‑help group is  really  looking for  outside
support to strengthen their self‑organisation, a very rare case in East Africa. In many
cases brokers present a shaped reality where some needs of a community that fit into the
program of  a  development agency are named as  the priorities  and some community
members might form a "self‑help group". In other cases the broker presents a phantom
reality.  The  term  phantom  reality  follows  Goffman's  term  of  a  phantom  normalcy
(Goffman 1967 : 152) that describes a special element of an interaction process. People are
willing to act as if both actors were normal, to make the process of interaction easier even
in cases where both actors know that one of them is not normal. In the same way here the
agency might know or guess that the presented reality is a fake, but the agency is willing
to accept it, to make the project go. To give an example : To present the desired self‑help
group,  a  group of  self‑employed artisans  calls  themselves  a  co‑operative,  or  a  small
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entrepreneur declares his employees as members of a co‑operative and himself as the
chairperson.
52 In all cases of reality presentation, brokers are successful viewed from both perspectives.
The development agency has the local partners with the "right" needs, and the local
community has at least some project. The bargain is perfect. In this sense, brokers are
catalysts who facilitate what both sides want : "a project".
53 At  the  same  rime  brokers,  assessed  on  a  more  persona !  and  moral  level  might  be
parasites as well. Ideally, brokers should work for nothing with political or humanitarian
motivation. The authority trap shows that even without payment, they may get a reward
that works against the development targets. Brokers can gain much more than authority,
they could manage to be preferred beneficiaries of the program. They might be employed
as local  project staff  or even misappropriate projects funds.  There are extreme cases
possible where the broker tries to channel all the outside support into his own pocket or
the local groups do not exist at all. Except for large scale misappropriation of funds, all
other personal gains of brokers are usually acceptable for the development agencies.
54 For the development system, the catalyst role as broker of reality is the main one, and in
this  role  the  development  brokers  are  successful.  But  this  is  a  cynical  conclusion.
Obviously all discussed types of brokers do not meet the targets of development policy
sufficiently.  Brokers  do  not  strengthen  participation.  Need  orientation  with  (weak)
grass‑roots brokers or weak profession al brokers happens only in rare cases by chance or
as a result of an uncontrollable enlighted top‑down approach. The accountability to the
local  community  is  limited  to  the  question,  of  whether  they  get  a  project  or  not.
Accountability to development agencies means producing adequate projects.
55 The question of self‑organisation is a little bit more complicated. The creation of self‑help
groups, the shaping of needs into projects and the existence of skilled brokers are signs of
successful  societal  self‑organisation.  But  this  is  a  distorted  self‑organisation.  The
incentive is an outside supply of aid. The problem is not the existence of the brokers or
the bad behaviour by some brokers,  but the underlying organisational  principle.  The
structures created by outside supply are shaped to get and use that supply controlled by
outside agencies. These structures are not created for handling own problems under local
control, at best they succeed in undermining outside control. Additionally, the projects
and the network of brokers, group initiators and promoters form a parallel structure to
already existing structures (e.g. traditional leaders, local administration).
56 The question is whether there are any choices for the development system. The main
structural problem of development aid is the idea of planned development (Musto 1987 ;
Neuben  1994 :  288‑297).  The  notion  is  that  development  could  be  planned  and
implemented step‑by‑step. Organisation building is a part of this approach. To strengthen
self‑organisation is in principle a good idea, but the organisations should be designed to
handle their own problems first and not only outside supply. If we take the target of
self‑organisation  seriously,  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  detailed  plan  how  to  realise
self‑organisation. Self‑organisation means freedom to organise itself, to formulate own
priorities and includes the right to make mistakes. This leads us to a core dilemma of the
promotion  of  self‑organisation.  The  targets  and  the  result  of  successful  societal
self‑organisation  cannot  be  set  by  the  donors.  At  the  same  time,  the  supported
organisations or groups cannot insist on funding for all their activities. Self‑help groups
might choose due to their  lack of  experience an unreasonable prestigious project  or
choose activities doomed to failure. They will thus use the donors funds for the "wrong"
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things. Radical ethnic or religious groups do not have a "right" to funds. Neither brokers,
self‑help groups nor representatives of local communities are always trustworthy, as the
numerous local conflicts on the moral and integrity of group leaders and members show.
This gives the donors a right to their own decision and a right to ask for accountability.
But every funding decision, every target set for the use of funds is an external influence.
As long as donors fund groups and organisations, they are responsible for their funding
decisions. The question is the selection of funding criteria.
57 Keepin in line with the idea of societal self‑organisation, donors should look for local
structures that are able to handle mainly local problems. Brokers should be linked into a
network  of  local  control  and  accountability.  In  general,  the  promotion  of
self‑organisation has to begin with more independence on the local level that leads us to
local self‑governance and local democracy, but this a long way to go.
58 Local communities must take an active role in the process. If they wish, they can reject
unwanted aid. The refusal of aid is their strongest argument and can push donors into a
real negotiation process. This is not only a theoretical possibility. At least, there are a few
examples of local communities who did not accept offered aid (e.g. in Uganda). This was
possible after a long civil war that created the feeling, that outsiders could not be trusted
and the community had to stay on its own.
59 Additionally, there is no reason why efficiency and the assimilation of recent trends in
the development  policy  must  always  be the most  important  criteria  for  donors.  The
strength  of  the  non‑governmental  sector  has  been  the  variety  of  organisations  and
approaches. Only when donors go different ways, will we have the chance to develop or
invent new approaches. Those who look for innovations must accept failure and they
need plenty of patience.
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NOTES
1.These are the NGOs ADEHAMU, ADECOK, ADENY A. AJEMAC.
2.Sometimes however they become professionalised as a result of the process, like
promoters who create local project networks or local development associations.
3.We have good reasons to hesitate, because the recurrent cost will limit all other
activities in the future. But this argument does not follow the felt‑needs of the people.
4.Poor people can only participate in a small credit scheme when the whole investment is
covered by the credit scheme. Even in this case they face heavy problems. Sickness of a
family member, or even school fees, or a school uniform for the children could not be
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paid from the income. Usually some money from the business is used to coyer these
expenses. This money is lacking to refill the stock of the small business or to buy
materials for production or to repay the loan. Without the possibility of building up some
savings, all these small enterprises will face bankruptcy sooner or later.
5.This could be seen very clearly in two Rwandan local project networks that already had
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